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Untangling Tenth Amendment Standing:
Why Private Parties Cannot Enforce the
Federal Structure
by DAVID M. PALMER*

I.

Introduction

The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' These grand and
purposeful words encapsulate "perhaps our oldest question of constitutional
law": What is the "proper division of authority between the Federal
Government and the States?"'2 Indeed, there has been much disagreement
on the meaning of the Tenth Amendment since its ratification in 179 1.3 In
the last thirty years, however, the Tenth Amendment has experienced a
resurgence as an independent check on the powers of the federal
government. 4 This newfound interest in the meaning and power of the
Tenth Amendment has inevitably led to the question: Who may bring a
As the Tenth Amendment concerns the
Tenth Amendment claim?
relationship between states and the federal government, states, not private
parties, have traditionally acted as plaintiffs in suits against federal
government incursion.5 However, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts

* J.D. candidate, May 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
Government, 2001, University of Texas at Austin.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
2. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
3.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 316, 1279

(3d ed. 2006).
4. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Tenth Amendment over Two Centuries: More than a
Truism, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 41, 104 (Mark R. Killenbeck ed.,

2002). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 313.
5. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Nat'l League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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of Appeals have, in a series of cases beginning twenty-five years ago,
expressly permitted private parties to bring Tenth Amendment claims
against the federal government. 6 In contrast, the First, Second, and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeals have expressly
denied private parties the
7
standing to bring Tenth Amendment claims.
What is the origin of this circuit split and why does it persist? How
does authority guide us in answering this question?
While there is
something very alluring about the idea that an everyday private citizen can
use the Tenth Amendment to keep the federal government's power in
check, the purpose and practicalities of the Tenth Amendment necessarily
prevent private citizens from bringing such claims. This note, in contrast to
other legal scholarship on this issue,8 argues that only states, not private
parties, are meant to use the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional check on
federal power.
II. Setting the Stage: The History of the Tenth Amendment
A.

The History of the Tenth Amendment

To understand who should have the power to wield the Tenth
Amendment, it is important to understand its somewhat bizarre history.
Prior to the 1990s, the Supreme Court oscillated between two positions on
the Amendment: first, that it contained no substantive content and simply
reinforced the idea that Congress may only legislate within its
constitutional authority, and second, that it reserved certain governmental
9
activities for the states and therefore protects state sovereignty.
During the first part of the twentieth century, the Court used the Tenth
Amendment to limit Congress' commerce power.10
In Hammer v.
Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), the Court held a federal law that
prohibited the interstate trafficking of goods produced by child labor
unconstitutional because it interfered with a state's right to control local

6. Dillard v. Baldwin County Com'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1276-1277 (11th Cir. 2000);
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 1999); Seniors Civil Liberties
Ass'n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1992); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S.
Dept. ofEnergy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n.16 (1 th Cir. 1982).
7. Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. B v. Legal Services Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 234 (2d Cir.
2006); Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2005); Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980).
8. See Douglas G. Bechtel, U.S. v. Parker: Will Those With Standing Please Stand Up, 82
DENV. U. L. REV. 479, 497 (2005); Ara B. Gershengorn, PrivateParty Standing to Raise Tenth
Amendment Commandeering Challenges, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1065, 1095 (2000).
9.

10.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 313.

Id. at 317.
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trade and manufacturing." The Court concluded that Congress could not
regulate "production," which it deemed a "local power always existing and
carefully reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment."' 12 In the 1920s
and early 1930s, the Court used similar reasoning to again uphold state
interests by striking down federal regulation of manufacturing and
agricultural output. 13 However, in the years to come, the Court's position
on the meaning of Tenth Amendment would change in the1 wake
of the
4
Court's move away from Lochner era substantive due process.
In 1941, when a commerce clause challenge to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 arose under United States v. Darby, the Court
asserted a dramatically different position on the meaning Tenth
Amendment and held that it could not be used to limit Congress' other
enumerated powers.15 The Court stated: "The amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing
in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of
the relationship between the national and state governments."' 16 This
pronouncement all but reduced the Tenth Amendment to a constitutional
superfluity. States could therefore no longer use the Amendment to
challenge federal laws inimical to local interests, and it remained this way
for several decades.
In 1975, in Fry v. United States, the Tenth Amendment made its first
major reappearance in over forty years.' 7 In upholding the Federal
Economic Stabilization Act's wage increases for state and local
government workers, Justice Thurgood Marshall addressed the claim that
the Act usurped the states' sovereign power to set wages for its workers in
violation of the Tenth Amendment.' 8 While the Court ultimately rejected
this claim, Justice Marshall's opinion marked a significant change of
viewpoint when it announced that the Tenth Amendment "is not without
significance."' 9
More specifically, the opinion noted that "[t]he
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
11. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,276 (1918).
12. Id. at 274.
13. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20, 36-38 (1922).
14. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 4 at 50.
15. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
16. Id.
17. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); see also Kevin Todd Butler, Printz v. United
States: Tenth Amendment Limitations on FederalAccess to the Mechanisms ofState Government,
49 MERCER L. REV. 595, 607 (1998).
18. Fry, 421 U.S. at 547.
19. Id. at 547 n.7.
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not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system., 20 Only one year after
Fry, the Court applied this newfound limitation on federal power in
National League of Cities v. Usery.21 In National League of Cities, Justice
Rehnquist held that the Fair Labor Standards Act's federal minimum wage
and hour provisions were an illegal imposition of federal power on state
spheres of control.22 The opinion noted that there were indeed limits on
Congress' ability to "override state sovereignty, even when exercising its
otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce.

23

In this

instance, the Tenth Amendment prevented the Fair Labor Standards Act
from "directly displac[ing] the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions., 24 While some
scholars predicted that National League of Cities marked a resurgence of
state sovereignty over "traditional state governmental functions,, 25 a series
of decisions in the ensuing years systematically rejected similar Tenth
Amendment challenges to federal laws and called into question the
continuing viability of the decision.2 6
By 1985, in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, the
Court found that applying the "traditional state governmental functions"
definition in deciding Tenth Amendment claims was "unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice" and led to "inconsistent results. ' 27 The
inconsistencies, Justice Blackmun claimed, derived from courts making
Tenth Amendment decisions based on their preference or dislike of a
particular state policy, rather than a sound understanding of what, exactly,
qualified as "traditional state governmental functions. 28 Instead, Justice
Blackmun felt that state sovereignty was, in fact, better protected through
political safeguards "inherent in the structure of the federal system," rather

20. Id.
21. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
22. Id. at 840.
23. Id. at 842.
24. Id. at 852.
25. See Frank Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: The Permutations of
"Sovereignty" in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J. 1165, 1192 (1977); Laurence
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
EssentialGovernment Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1068 (1977).
26. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983);
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769-770 (1982); Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 293 (1981).
27.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).

28. Id. at 546.
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than what he saw as a judicially created limitation on federal power.29
Justice Blackmun explained that while "we continue to recognize that the
States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional
system.., the political process ensures that the laws that unduly burden the
States will not be promulgated. 30 In other words, the federal political
process was alone sufficient to protect state sovereignty without the help of
the Tenth Amendment. Deemed unworkable and unnecessary, the Court
effectively washed its hands of the Tenth Amendment for the second time
in the twentieth century.
Interestingly, cases such as Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation, which chipped away at the Tenth Amendment's substantive
viability following its revival in National League of Cities, held the key
for the resurgence of the amendment in the early 1990s. 31 More
specifically, while the Court rejected a challenge in Hodel that federal
laws regulating mining were interfering with state sovereignty, the
decision stipulated that a Tenth Amendment violation could be still found
in a situation where the federal government "commandeer[ed] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program." 32 Such a "commandeering"
situation did, however, present itself in the facts of New York v. United
States and permitted the Court to once again use the Tenth Amendment to
invalidate federal laws.33 New York involved a dispute over provisions of
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that
required states to either regulate radioactive waste according to Congress'
instructions or "take title" to the waste.34 Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor held that this provision violated the Tenth Amendment, as
states were either "commandeered" into taking ownership of the waste or
required to implement legislation enacted by Congress. 35 Justice
O'Connor was very careful in distinguishing between previous Tenth
Amendment cases such as Hodel, National League of Cities, and Garcia
and the "commandeering" situation found in New York:
Most of our recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have
concerned the authority of Congress to subject state governments to

29. Id. at 552.
30. Id. at 551.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
32. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
33. New York v. Unites States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
34. Id. at 144, 153.
35. Id. at 175.
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generally applicable laws ...This litigation instead concerns the

circumstances under which Congress may use the States as
implements of regulation; that is, whether Congress may direct or
otherwise motivate
the States to regulate in a particular field or a
36
particular way.

After New York, the Court's modem interpretation of the scope of the
Tenth Amendment's power was better defined.
While the federal
government could control activity within the states by preempting state
legislation or attaching conditions to federal funds, it could "not compel
37
states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.,
Only a few years later in Printz v. United States, the Court again came
upon a federal law that violated the Tenth Amendment.38 In Printz, the
Court examined a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act requiring local law enforcement officers to review the credentials of
potential firearm purchasers as a prerequisite to buying a gun. 39 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the provision illegally
commandeered state law enforcement officials into the service of the
federal government. 40 Notably, the Printz decision expanded New York's
definition of illegal "commandeering" to include not only federal laws that
require states to enact and enforce federal regulatory program but also
federal statutory provisions requiring state executive officials to administer
a federal statute.41
The Court's most recent refinement of the power of the Tenth
Amendment occurred in Reno v. Condon.4 2 In Reno, the Court rejected a
Tenth Amendment challenge to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which
prevented states from selling personal information gained from the driver's
license registration process to private businesses without the consent of the
registrant.43 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the court, held that the
situation in Reno was unlike that in New York or Printz because the Act
contained no provision requiring affirmative action on the part of the state

36. Id. at 160-61 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 188.
38. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
39. Id. at 902-03.
40. Id. at 933.
41. Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 Sup.
CT. REV. 199 (1997).
42. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000).
43.

Id. at 144.
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legislature. a

Instead the act was simply a prohibition of conduct.45
Federal laws prohibiting state conduct could no longer be struck down as
violating the Tenth Amendment's "commandeering" principle.46
With the Reno decision the Court completed its construction of
modern foundation for the application of the Tenth Amendment. Notably,
each Tenth Amendment decision since National League of Cities involved
claims by some sort of state or local government entity.4 7 In other words,
private citizens were not making these Tenth Amendment claims.4t What
kind of situation, then, would cause a private party to bring a Tenth
Amendment claim?
B. Medeiros v. Vincent
The factual basis for Medeiros v. Vincent, a 2005 First Circuit case, is
in many ways representative of the type of situation that would lead a
private citizen to bring a Tenth Amendment claim. 49 In addition, the
arguments set forth by the plaintiff in Medeiros are representative of the
major arguments proponents of private party Tenth Amendment standing
use to support their cause. 50 With this in mind, Medeiros proves to be an
appropriate anecdotal backdrop for this discussion.
In 1942, fifteen Atlantic coast states and the District of Columbia
signed a compact to jointly regulate the oversight of coastal fishing through
the voluntary use of interstate fishery management plans.5' In 1993,
Congress decided to improve state cooperation with these plans by making
compliance mandatory and created the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries
Cooperative Management Act. 52 The Act permits the Atlantic States
Marine Fisheries Commission to identify "necessary" provisions of the
interstate fishery management plans and requires that member states adopt
and comply with these provisions.53
In 1997, in response to evidence of lobster over-fishing, the Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission promulgated an amendment to an
44. Id. 150-51.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
48.
49.

See Printz, 521 U.S. 898; New York, 505 U.S. 144; Garcia,469 U.S. 528.
Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 27-29 (1st Cir. 2005).

50. Id. at 33-36. See also Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d
219, 234-36.
51. Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d at 27.
52. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5108 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
53. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101(a)(4), 5104(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
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interstate fishery management plan that limited each vessel to catching 100
lobsters per day.54 Rhode Island, in turn, implemented this regulation
through the Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council.
In June 1999,
Stephen Medeiros, a commercial fisherman from Rhode Island was
criminally charged for having brought in 131 lobsters in violation of the
100-per-day limit. 56 The charge was eventually dismissed.57 In 2001,
Medeiros sought declaratory and injunctive relief that the state regulation
of lobster catches, mandated by the federal Atlantic Coastal Fisheries
Cooperative Management Act, amounted to an illegal commandeering of
Rhode Island's legislative process in violation of the Tenth Amendment.5 8
To support his standing to bring the Tenth Amendment claim, Medeiros
advanced questionable interpretations of Supreme Court and Circuit Courts
of Appeals decisions.5 9 On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held
that even if they were to find that the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries
Cooperative Management Act illegally forced Rhode Island to promulgate
the cap on lobster fishing in violation of the Tenth Amendment, Medieros'
arguments could not support his standing to bring the claim.60 Although
the legislative commandeering claim in Medeiros is not indicative of all
private party Tenth Amendment claims, 61 the situation of a private party
claiming to have been injured by a state law "forced" onto a state by a
federal measure would likely be the most common type of Tenth
Amendment claim if private standing were widely granted.62

III. The Standing Doctrine
A.

The Purpose of the Standing Doctrine
Full understanding and appreciation of the Tenth
standing dilemma requires explanation of the basic principles
Many scholars consider standing to be one of the most
confusing areas of constitutional law.63 Constitutional Scholar

Amendment
of standing.
elusive and
Paul Freund

54. Id. at 28.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Medeiros v. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Comm'n, 327 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148-49 (D.
R.I. 2004).
59. Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d at 34-35. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
60. Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d at 34.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 216-17.
62. Id.
63.

See JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 1 (1978).
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once described standing issues as "among the most amorphous in the entire
domain of public law." 64 Notwithstanding its perplexing nature, standing
has a fundamental role in the American legal system as "the question of
standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the
merits of the dispute or of particular issues., 65 In other words, standing
decides the question: "Who may bring the claim?"
The Supreme Court has articulated several reasons to justify the
requirements of the standing doctrine. In Allen v. Wright, the Court stated
that "standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers. 66 In other words, the standing doctrine promotes the separation of
powers by "prevent[ing] courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to
the political branches. 6 7 Second, standing has also been said to ensure the
effectiveness of the federal courts by making sure that their limited
resources are directed to those who have more than simply a political or
ideological interest in the result of the case.68 Third, and perhaps most
importantly for questions of Tenth Amendment standing, is the idea that
fairness problems arise when a purely ideological challenger, without a
personal stake, is permitted to bring a constitutional claim.69 In Singleton
v. Wulff the Court warned against such third party standing,
Federal courts must hesitate before resolving a controversy, even one
within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights
of third persons not parties to the litigation. The reasons are two.
First, the courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and
it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to
assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the
in-court litigant is successful or not .... Second, third parties
themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own rights. 70
Whether or not separation of powers, the preservation of judicial
resources, or the fairness of asserting one's own personal rights are served

64. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Hearing on S. 2097 before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 498 (1966)
(statement of Paul A. Freund, Professor of Law)).
65. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
66. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
67. Lewis v. Casey 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881

(1983).
68.

United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).

69. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306 (1979).
70.

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976).
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by the standing doctrine, the idea that who is making a claim is just as
important as what is being claimed has become an essential part of every
federal case.71 Justice Scalia may have summed up the idea of standing
best when he stated that the federal courts standing requirement is the
judicial equivalent of a rude retort heard when
someone complains about
72
another's actions, that is: "What's it

to

B. General Standing Requirements

you?

73

The standing doctrine finds its constitutional basis in Article III, which
states that the "judicial Power shall extend" to certain "Cases" and
"Controversies." 74 There are three requirements for making a claim in
federal court. 75 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"an actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest that is not
merely hypothetical but concrete and particularized. 76 Second, there must
be a causal connection between the alleged injury and the harmful conduct;
the injury must be traceable to the defendant's action.7 7 Third, it must be
likely that the plaintiffs injury would be redressed by a favorable
decision. 78 All three prescribed requirements for standing must be met, or a
litigant's claim will be summarily dismissed before the merits are even
considered.79
Not only is there a standing hurdle to individuals bringing claims in
federal court, the Court has also announced a prudential bar to most third
party standing suits.80 In Warth v. Seldin the Court stated that "even when

the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the 'case or controversy'
requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiff generally must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the

71. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998) (explaining that
jurisdiction must always be established as a threshold matter before reaching the merits of a case).
72. Scalia, supra note 67, at 882.
73. 1 will refer to these requirements as "general standing requirements" in order to
distinguish them from the requirements needed to bring a generalized grievance claim.
74. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
75. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
76. Id.(citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 756 (1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 (1983); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 (1972)).
77. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 4142 (1976)).
78. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
79. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1983).
80.

Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
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parties." 81

This third party standing bar has
legal rights or interests of third
important application in private party Tenth Amendment cases as
individuals are essentially claiming that a third party's rights, the state's
rights, are being infringed upon by the federal government.
In addition to the bar against third party standing, the Court has also
announced a prudential bar against "generalized grievances." 82 A
generalized grievance occurs when someone claims that he or she has been
injured by Congress' alleged illegal expenditures of tax revenues. 83 A
generalized grievance is not an injury specific to the claimant but is, in
reality, "shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens. 84 As an example, in Frothingham v. Mellon, a taxpayer asserted
that the Maternity Act was unconstitutional because it created an increased
burden of future taxation for the claimant and for all taxpayers, thereby
taking taxpayer property (money) without due process of law in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. 85 The Court held that a taxpayer's interest in
challenging the constitutionality of the expenditure of funds, without a
direct injury, is86"minute and indeterminable," and therefore should not
permit standing.
More than forty years later, the Court made an exception to the bar
against generalized grievances and allowed standing under a narrow set of
circumstances announced in Flast v. Cohen.87 Specifically, the Court
announced that a taxpayer may claim an unconstitutional expenditure of
funds when "there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the
claim sought to be adjudicated., 88 This means that first a taxpayer "must
establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative
enactment attacked., 89 In other words, the challenged expenditure must
originate under the taxing and spending clause. 90 Second, the taxpayer
"must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the
constitutional infringement alleged." 9' For example, as a taxpayer, one

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 91.
84. Warth, 422 U.S. at499.
85. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,486 (1923).
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 487.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
Id.

89.

Id.

90.

JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 88

(2d ed. 2005).
91. Id.at 44.
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could bring a claim that Congress is using its power under the spending
clause (first nexus requirement) to spend taxpayer funds in violation of the
establishment clause (second nexus requirement), which has been
interpreted as prohibiting expenditure of public funds for religious
purposes. 92 As a counterexample, in Frothingham, the plaintiff did
establish the first nexus requirement by attacking a federal spending
program, but the second nexus requirement was not fulfilled because
Congress' spending was supposedly in violation of the Fifth Amendment's
takings clause. 93 The takings clause, unlike the establishment clause, does
not establish a constitutional spending limitation and therefore Congress'
spending had not violated the constitution.94 Therefore the second nexus
requirement was not fulfilled.
Not surprisingly, the Court has permitted the Flast nexus exception to
the bar on generalized grievances in only one type of situation: First
95
Amendment establishment clause challenges to government expenditures.
This narrow exception, while seemingly unrelated to private party Tenth
Amendment standing, has played an unlikely role in the justification for
granting private party standing in the relevant decisions of both the Seventh
and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.9 6
C. History of Private Party Tenth Amendment Standing
Compared with the relatively well-defined scope of generalized
standing requirements, guidance on the issue of private party Tenth
Amendment standing has been spare. The major decisions in this area
occurred well before the modem resurgence of the Tenth Amendment in
National League of Cities and its final interpretation in cases such as New
York and Printz.97 In 1937, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis and Helvering v.
Davis challenged the Social Security Act, and the Court overturned these
Tenth Amendment claims brought by a manufacturing corporation and by a
private shareholder of an electric company. 98 Although the Court did not

92. See Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
93. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104-05 (1968).
94. Id. at 105.
95. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 95 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 183 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 227 (1974)).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 155-60, 196-97.
97. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 105; Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118,
144 (1939).
98. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Steward Machine Co v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 585 (1937).
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expressly address Tenth Amendment standing, it impliedly permitted
private parties to make such claims as it ruled on the merits of their claims
without questioning their ability to bring the claims. 99 Two years later, the
Court addressed the issue more explicitly in Tennessee Electric Power Co.
v. Tennessee Valley Authority (hereinafter "TVA").' 00 In 1933, as part of
New Deal legislation, the federal government created the Tennessee Valley
Authority to develop a series of dams on the Tennessee River in order to
control flooding and navigation and to sell electricity.' 01 In an effort to
stifle this new competition, eighteen local power producers and distributors
sued to enjoin the Tennessee Valley Authority from operating.10 2 The local
power producers claimed that the scheme of allowing the Tennessee Valley
Authority to contract with municipalities for a reduced price of electricity
was a "federal regulation of purely local matters reserved to the states" as it
had the effect of "regulating" market-wide rates. 0 3 After declaring that
"[t]he sale of government property [electricity] in competition with others
is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment,"10 4 the Court added: "As we
have seen there is no objection to the Authority's operations by the states,
and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent the states or their officers,
05
have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment."'
This very brief statement from 1939 has served as the Court's most explicit
pronouncement on the private party Tenth Amendment standing issue.
And, while the Court's interpretation of the practical meaning of the Tenth
Amendment 10has
shifted over the years, 0 6 the Court has never overturned
7
this holding.

The Court also reiterated its disfavor of private party Tenth
Amendment standing in its jurisprudence regarding generalized grievances.
In Frothingham, the Court not only stated that a taxpayer's injury from the
alleged unconstitutional expenditure of funds through the Maternity Act
was too small to permit standing, creating the bar against generalized
grievances, but also rejected the idea that the Act's requirement of
cooperation from the state agencies was an usurpation of state sovereignty

99. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 585.
100. Tenn. Elec. Power Co., 306 U.S. at 144 (1939).
101. Id. at 134.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 143.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 144.
Id.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 313.
Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2005).
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in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 0 8 Many years later in Flast, the
Court created an exception to bar against generalized grievances by
announcing the nexus requirement. 0 9
The Flast decision also
distinguished the facts of Frothingham and criticized the plaintiffs
standing to bring the Tenth Amendment claim: "In essence, Mrs.
Frothingham was attempting to assert the States' interest in their legislative
prerogatives and not a federal taxpayer's interest in being free of taxing and
spending in contravention of specific constitutional limitations imposed
upon Congress' taxing and spending power."' 10 Essentially, this statement
confirms the Court's disapproval of private parties claiming that their
state's rights have been infringed. In fact, the Court has reiterated that a
state and a state alone must assert its own rights in several decisions since
Flast.1'"
IV. Refuting the Arguments in Favor of
Private Party Tenth Amendment Standing
Proponents of private party Tenth Amendment standing, including the
appellant in Medeiros, point to three main reasons why they believe the
Court should expressly endorse their views. 12 These include the unmerited
dismissal of the TVA precedent, an incorrect interpretation of Justice
O'Connor's statements in New York, and deference to wrongly decided
cases from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. 13 At first
blush, these three arguments seem quite reasonable; however, a deeper
consideration reveals major flaws. In addition, even if private party Tenth
Amendment standing were permitted, plaintiffs would inevitably suffer
from a redressability problem, as relief from federal law would not
necessarily result in relief from the state law that is directly causing their
alleged injury.' 14
A. The TVA Decision
A controversy exists over whether the Court's 1939 pronouncement
against private party standing under the Tenth Amendment in TVA was

108.
109.
110.
111.
Charles,
112.
113.
114.

Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479-80, 487 (1923).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1942).
Id.at 105.
See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65-66 (1997); Diamond v.
476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986).
Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d at 34-35.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 210-11.
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simply an "observation in passing" or a true holding.' 5 If the Court's
statement in TVA is simply dicta, then proponents of private party Tenth
Amendment standing may argue that the TVA decision has little bearing on
whether the Court should grant private party standing today. An
understanding of some jurisprudential theory helps to sort out this debate.
A careful reading will reveal that the Court dismissed the Tenth
Amendment claim only after considering both the standing of the parties
and the merits of the claim. 1 6 In doing so, the Court's jurisprudence on the
standing claim cannot be characterized as dicta but as one of two
independent reasons given to support its ruling. 1 7 In such a situation the
Court has recognized that "where a decision rests on two or more grounds,
none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum."" 8 This, in turn,
means that TVA's holding on Tenth Amendment standing is binding
precedent and continues to be today as it has not been repudiated in a
subsequent case."l 9 The TVA decision also bears on the continuing validity
of older decisions such as Steward Machine Co. v. Davis and Helvering v.
Davis, which impliedly granted private party Tenth Amendment
standing. 120 Given that TVA explicitly overturned any precedent, implicit
or otherwise, supporting private party Tenth Amendment standing, there is
no basis to conclude that today's Court should follow pre-TVA decisions
and grant private party standing.12' After
all, the Supreme Court alone has
122
decisions.
its
overturn
to
the prerogative
B.

New York v. United States

In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court revived the Tenth
Amendment's role in constitutional jurisprudence from its weakened state
in Garcia.'23 In New York, Justice O'Connor not only articulated the
modern standard for bringing a successful Tenth Amendment claim, i.e.,
federal commandeering of a state government, 124 but also offered some

115. See Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d at 34; Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693,
700 (7th Cir. 1999).
116. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939).
117.
118.

Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949).
Id.

119. Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d at 34.
120. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937).
121. Tenn Elec. Power Co., 306 U.S. at 144.
122. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
124.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 142, 188 (1992).
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insight as to its history and purpose. 2 5 In one discussion regarding the
purpose of federalism, Justice O'Connor states:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political
entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the
States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power."
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the
departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of
1 26
state officials.
Proponents of private party Tenth Amendment standing argue that this
statement implicitly overrules the TVA decision because it recognizes that
the Tenth Amendment's purpose is to protect individuals, and therefore
1 27
private individuals should be able to bring Tenth Amendment claims.
While it is true that federalism ultimately secures the rights of
individuals, this statement does not, in any sense, justify private party
standing. First, Justice O'Connor's comment is found within the context of
a discussion about whether a state's previous consent to the enactment of a
federal program should be seen as an obstacle to its current Tenth
Amendment claim; the statement is not found within a discussion about
standing. 28 Justice O'Connor is simply explaining that because federalism
ultimately serves the purpose of securing our individual liberties, no
infringement upon the federal structure should be tolerated. 29 To reiterate
this point, Justice O'Connor follows up her statement with a quote from
Gregory v. Ashcroft which states that a strong federal structure will help
prevent "tyranny and abuse [of the people] from either front."' 30 Therefore,
Justice O'Connor's statement only demonstrates the Court's belief that
there is a compelling reason for the enforcement of the Tenth Amendment.
Contrary to proponents of private party Tenth Amendment standing, this
125. Id.
at 161-66, 181.
126. Id. at 181-82 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
127. Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2005).
128. New York, 505 U.S. at 181-182.
129. Id.
130. Id.(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting Alexander
Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 180-81 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) (referring to tyranny with
reference to the people, not the tyranny of the federal government over the states)).
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statement does not, in any fashion, say who has the right to enforce the
federal structure. 13 1 Indeed, the Court does not discuss the topic of
standing at all in New York, nor mentions or overrules the TVA ban on
private party Tenth Amendment standing. 132 In sum, no reasonable
interpretation of Justice O'Connor's statement in New York should find that
it bestows Tenth Amendment standing on private parties. Although New
York gives an interpretation of an independently powerful Tenth
Amendment, this does not mean that the decision places the power to use
the Amendment in the hands of private parties.
C. Decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals
Five Circuit Courts of Appeals have explicitly addressed the issue of
private party Tenth Amendment standing: the First, Second, Seventh, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits. 133 In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle,
the Tenth Circuit became the first Circuit Court of Appeals to render a
decision on the question of private party standing under the Tenth
Amendment. 134 In Mountain States Legal Foundation, a non-profit
corporation and a group of state legislators challenged the Environmental
Protection Agency's conditional approval of Colorado's state
implementation of the Clean Air Act. 135 The court forcefully rejected the
notion that private party standing could sustain the Tenth Amendment
claim by relying on the well-established principal that third parties may
generally not sue to enforce the rights of others. 136 Indeed, the court stated
that the private parties could not show a "personal stake" in the controversy
and that therefore "[o]nly the State has standing to press claims
aimed at
137
protecting its sovereign powers under the Tenth Amendment."'
Within the last two years, two other Circuit Courts of Appeals also
rejected private party Tenth Amendment standing but have principally
relied on the Court's 1939 TVA decision. 38 In 2005, the First Circuit ruled

131.

Id.

132. Id. at 144.
133. Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B v. Legal Services, 462 F.3d 219, 234 (2nd Cir. 2006);
Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d at 34; Dillard v. Bowling County Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 12761277 (11th Cir. 2000); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 1999);
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't. of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n.16(llth Cir. 1982);
Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 n.6 (1lth Cir. 1992); Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (1980).
134. See supra notes 6-7.
135. Mountain States Legal Found., 630 F.2d at 756-57.
136. Id. at 761; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
137. Mountain States Legal Found., 630 F.2d at 761; see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
138. Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B, 462 F.3d at 234; Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d at 34.
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against private party Tenth Amendment standing in Medeiros. 39 Even
more recently, in Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. B, the Second Circuit
followed suit. 40 In that case, a non-profit legal foundation challenged the
constitutionality of federal restrictions on local legal assistance programs
14
that receive federal funding through the Legal Services Corporation.'
One of the claims against the federal restrictions was that they violated
142
"fundamental principles of federalism" under the Tenth Amendment.
After noting that establishing jurisdiction is a prerequisite to reaching the
merits of a claim, the court held the TVA decision binds it from granting
private party standing.143 In conclusion, the court bluntly stated: "The
Supreme Court's determination that the plaintiffs under these
circumstances have no standing ends our inquiry."' 144 Other Federal
District Courts have also relied upon the continuing validity of TVA in
denying private party standing under the Tenth Amendment. 145
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has granted private
party standing under the Tenth Amendment in three decisions, albeit with
"reservations," "admitted doubts," and "uncertainty."' 146 In Atlanta Gas,
the Atlantic Gas Company challenged the constitutionality of certain
provisions and accompanying regulations of the Power Plant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978. 147 More specifically, it claimed that the Act violated
the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment by regulating the
distribution of natural gas, which they claimed to be "a subject of purely
local concern historically left within the purview of state or municipal
regulatory authority.' ' 148 Before reaching the Tenth Amendment issue as to
whether the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act violated traditional
state government functions (the test articulated in National League of

139.
140.

Medeiros v. Vincent, at 34.
Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B, 462 F.3d 234.

141.
142.

Id.at 221.
Id. at 224.

143. Id. at 234.
144. Id.
145. See Gaubert v. Denton, No. CIV. A. 98-2947, 1999 WL 350103, at *5 (E.D. La. May 28,
1999), ajfd, 210 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2000) (decision without published opinion); Vt. Assemb. of
Home Health Agencies, Inc. v. Shalala, 18 F. Supp. 2d 355, 370 (D. Vt. 1998).
146. Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1283 (7th Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J.,
concurring); Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 n.6 (11 th Cir.
1992); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't. of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n.16 (11th Cir.
1982).
147. Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1369.
148.

Id. at 1363-64.
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1 49

Cities), the Eleventh Circuit addressed the standing issue in a footnote.
After expressing "uncertainty" about whether the petitioners would have
standing to bring a Tenth Amendment claim, the court first noted that Flast
v. Cohen "intimated" under the nexus requirement that private parties do
not have standing to assert the interests of the states. 50 Despite this,
however, the court granted private party standing for two reasons:
First, during the New Deal era the Supreme Court granted such
standing by implication in considering the merits of the Tenth
Amendment claims brought by private parties. Second, the Court in
Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnv[ironmental]Study Group expressly

limited the nexus requirement contained in Flast to taxpayer suits.
Since this is not a taxpayer suit, under Duke Power the petitioners
may make constitutional objections based on any of its provisions so
long as they show the requisite injury in fact and its causal relation to
the action in question. Because we have already concluded that
injury in fact exists or is likely to occur in this case ...we15 1find it
necessary to reach the merits of the Tenth Amendment issue.
The Eleventh Circuit's rationale for allowing a private company to
make a Tenth Amendment claim has many flaws. First, the court did not
mention the TVA decision, which expressly bans private party Tenth
Amendment standing. 52 Regarding its first reason for granting private
party standing, New Deal era decisions such as Helvering v. Davis and
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis impliedly

permitted private

party

standing;153 however, these decisions were effectively overruled by the
more recent TVA case. 154 The second reason the Eleventh Circuit granted
private party standing is essentially a misinterpretation of Flast. There is
nothing incorrect in the court's assertion that Flast seemed to prohibit
private party standing under the Tenth Amendment. 55 Also correct is that
Flast did discuss the ban on private party standing under the Tenth
56
Amendment in the same section it announced the nexus requirement.1
However, Flast did not state that this private party standing ban under the
Tenth Amendment should only be valid in cases where plaintiffs assert a
149. Id. at 1368 n.16.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citations omitted).
152. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939).
153. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Steward Machine Co v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 585 (1937).
154. Tenn. Elec. Power Co., 306 U.S. at 144; see supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
155. Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105 (1968)).
156. Id.
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generalized grievance that requires the extra nexus requirement to establish
standing. 157 Nevertheless, in footnote 16 of Atlanta Gas, the Eleventh
Circuit seems to have inexorably tied the nexus requirement to private
party standing under the Tenth Amendment. 158 This misinterpretation led
the court to believe that Duke Power Co v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., which limited the nexus requirement to generalized grievance
(taxpayer) suits, impliedly permitted private parties to make Tenth
Amendment claims.159 Therefore, the court misguidedly but logically
permitted private party Tenth Amendment standing where the plaintiff did
not assert a generalized grievance that would necessitate fulfillment of the
nexus requirement to establish standing. 60
A careful look at Flast reveals that the Court's assertion that private
parties do not have standing under the Tenth Amendment was a general
observation made after it discussed why the plaintiff in Frothinghamcould
not assert a Tenth Amendment violation to fulfill the second nexus
requirement.16 In its discussion of the nexus requirement, the Court stated
that the Tenth Amendment did not place a limitation on Congress' taxing
and spending power.' 62 Therefore, unlike the Establishment Clause (which
has been interpreted to contain a constitutional limit on Congress'
spending), 163 a Tenth Amendment violation cannot fulfill the second nexus
requirement that links the plaintiffs status to the constitutional spending
infringement. 64 The Court made the general statement at the end of this
discussion that "Mrs. Frothingham was attempting to assert the States'
interest in their legislative prerogatives ....165
The Atlanta Gas decision also overlooked another major obstacle 1to
66
private party Tenth Amendment standing: the third party standing bar.
There is no denying that the factual situation in Atlanta Gas (a private
company asserting a state's constitutional rights) 167 is just the type of third

157. SeeFlast, 392 U.S. at 104-05.
158. Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16.
159.
Group,
160.
161.
162.
163.

Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978)).
Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 104-05.
Id. at 105.
See Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).

164. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105.
165. Id.
166. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
167. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't. of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1363-64 (11th Cir.
1982).

Winter 2008]

UNTANGLING TENTH AMENDMENT STANDING

189

party claim that the Court had explicitly denied in the past.1 68 Indeed, this
was the basis of the Tenth Circuit's decision that denied private party Tenth
Amendment standing in Mountain States Legal Foundation.'69 Under this
rationale then, even if the Eleventh Circuit's understanding of Flast is
accepted as true, the third party standing bar would have nevertheless
prohibited the court from granting private party Tenth Amendment
standing. 7 ° Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit should have overturned its
standing determination from Atlanta Gas when it had the opportunity.
However, in two subsequent cases the Eleventh Circuit continued to apply
its faulty7 reasoning and granted private party Tenth Amendment
standing. 1
In Seniors Civil Liberties Association, a 1992 decision, the court
rejected a claim by the Seniors Civil Liberties Association and other private
parties that the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act, which
prohibited discrimination against families with children, were in violation
of the First, Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 72 Addressing the
Tenth Amendment claim, the court stated that although it had "admitted
doubts" regarding the petitioners' standing, it would follow its holding in
Atlanta Gas and permit the claim as long as injury or threatened injury
existed.173 Later in Dillard, the Eleventh Circuit examined a challenge to a
federal district court's Voting Rights Act remedy. 74 The court rejected the
claim that certain intervenors did not have private party Tenth Amendment
standing by deferring to Atlanta Gas.175 The case was remanded for a
judgment on the merits. 7 6 Interestingly, Judge Rosemary Barkett
expressed her "reservations" in a concurring opinion regarding whether the
private parties could assert a Tenth Amendment claim. 177 In fact, she cited
TVA as opposing authority.' 78 Nevertheless, Judge Barkett stated that the

168. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65-66 (1997); Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986).
169. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980).
170. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
171. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1276-77 (lth Cir. 2000);
Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1992).
172. Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1032.
173. Id. at 1034 n.6.
174. Dillard,225 F.3d at 1273.
175. Id. at 1276-77.
176. Id. at 1274.
177. Id. at 1283.
178. Id.
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previous Eleventh Circuit cases permitted
private party Tenth Amendment
179
standing and may continue to do SO.
Following in the unsure footsteps of the Eleventh Circuit, in 1999 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals became the second and only Circuit
Court of Appeals to grant private party Tenth Amendment standing.' 80 In
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,Jerald Gillespie, a police officer with the
Indianapolis Police Department challenged the 1996 amendments to the
Gun Control Act of 1968 that prohibited those convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm. 18' In 1995 Gillespie
plead guilty to a misdemeanor domestic violence charge, which, under the
Gun Control Act amendments, codified at 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9),
prevented him from carrying a gun. 82
This conflicted with the
Indianapolis Police Department policy that required all officers to be
trained and carry a firearm. 83 As a result, the police department informed
Gillespie that he could no longer be employed and his position was
terminated. 184 Among a number of constitutional claims, Gillespie argued
that section 922(g)(9) of the Gun Control Act violated the Tenth
Amendment as it prevented the States from creating their own
qualifications for their armed
police and compelled state officers to
85
implement a federal statute.1
Before deciding on the merits of the Tenth Amendment claim, the
Seventh Circuit rightly considered the standing question. 86 The court first
admitted that the Supreme Court's 1939 TVA decision was contrary
authority.187 However, the court incorrectly characterized the TVA holding
as an "observ[ation] in passing.'' 88 The court also pointed to the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Mountain States Legal Foundationwhere private party
standing had been denied. 89 Nevertheless, this 1980 decision was
dismissed by simply stating that "' standing barriers have been substantially
lowered' in the in the decades since the Supreme Court decided Tennessee
179. Id. (citing Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1034 n.6; Atlanta Gas Light
Co. v. U.S. Dep't. of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n.16 (1 th Cir. 1982)).
180. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 1999).
181.
182.

Id. at697.
Id. at 698.

183.
184.

Id.
Id.

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
189. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 700 (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754,
761-62 (10th Cir. 1980)).
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Elec. Power Co." 190 After discussing the general standing requirements of
injury-in-fact, traceability and redressability, the court then delved into a
line of reasoning that ultimately justified its conclusion that Gillespie had
standing to pursue the Tenth Amendment claim.' 9'
The court first correctly identified the attenuated nature of Gillespie's
Tenth Amendment claim and asked, "Yes, Gillespie is constrained by the
[Gun Control] statute, but is he really injured by any Tenth Amendment
violation reflected in that statute?"' 92 The court also correctly stated that
"[t]he Tenth Amendment protects the sovereignty of the States, and
Gillespie's individual ability to carry a gun has nothing to do with Indiana's
status as a sovereign."' 93 There is even recognition that theoretically "[a]ny
injury to him by virtue of a Tenth Amendment violation is in this way
incidental."'' 94 However, the court then veered off course and followed the
same unsound reasoning of Atlanta Gas.'95 Specifically, the court looked
to Duke Power to support the idea that such an attenuated, incidental
connection is sufficient to bring a constitutional claim because the case
stated that the Flast nexus requirement was limited to generalized
grievance cases. 196 The statement of the holding from Duke Power is true;
however, as explained above, Flast did not tie together the ban on private
party Tenth Amendment standing and the nexus requirement for
generalized grievances. 97 Therefore, the fact that Duke Power made clear
that the nexus requirement is only a standing prerequisite in generalized
grievance cases did not lessen standing requirements and permit attenuated
claims by private parties.
After incorrectly assuming that Duke Power would permit Gillespie's
attenuated claim, the court then rightly identified the bar against third party
standing as preventing private party Tenth Amendment claims.' 98 However,
the court simply overcame this prudential standing limitation by referring
to Justice O'Connor's statements in New York regarding the ultimate
purpose of federalism (protecting individual liberties). 199 As previously

190. Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 193 (Powell, J., concurring)).
191. Id. at 701-04.
192. Id. at 701.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 701-02; see supra text accompanying notes 155-65.
196. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 702 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978)).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
198.

Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 702-03.

199.

Id. at 703.
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discussed, Justice O'Connor's statement cannot be correctly interpreted as
granting private party Tenth Amendment standing as it was simply an
observation of the purpose of federalism and in no way implicated the
standing doctrine. 200 Therefore, the third party standing bar still applied to
Gillespie, and contrary to the Seventh Circuit, prevented him from bringing

a Tenth Amendment claim.
In sum, Gillespie presents several unfounded arguments, echoing the

Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta Gas, and does not set forth a satisfactory
explanation for granting private party Tenth Amendment standing.
Interestingly, no plaintiff has prevailed on the merits of the Tenth

Amendment claim in the aforementioned Seventh and Eleventh Circuit
decisions granting private party Tenth Amendment standing. 20 1 Therefore,
one might argue that because the standing issues were not as paramount in
the courts' decision-making, a less-than-rigorous analysis was applied to
standing, especially if the courts perceived that the Tenth Amendment

claims had no merit.202 In any event, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits'
rationale for granting private party Tenth Amendment standing 20 3 does not
support a contradictory position from the Supreme Court's ban on Tenth
Amendment standing in TVA .204

V. The Redressability Problem
Even if one were to agree with Justice O'Connor's statement in New
York that Tenth Amendment violations cannot be ratified by the "consent"
of state officials, 20 5 there is a serious practical redressability problem when
private parties assume the role of enforcing the federal structure by
bringing Tenth Amendment claims. The third prong of the general
standing requirement is that it must be likely that the plaintiffs injury

200. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
201. See Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1281-82 (11 th Cir. 2000) (not
ruling on the Tenth Amendment claim but reversing and remanding lower court's dismissal of the
claim); Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 708; Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U. S. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d
1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982); Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n, Inc. v. Kemp 965 F.2d 1030, 1034
( lIth Cir. 1992).
202. See Dillard, 225 F.3d at 1281-82 (not ruling on the Tenth Amendment claim but
reversing and remanding lower court's dismissal of the claim); Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 708; Atlanta
Gas, 666 F.2d at 1369; Seniors Civil Liberties Ass 'n, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1034.
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would be redressed by a favorable decision by the court. °6 This means that
if relief is not likely to be granted then the plaintiff simply fails to meet the
redressability requirement and has no standing to bring the claim.20 7 In
order to properly bring claim under today's "commandeering"
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment claim, a state must allege that its
legislative or administrative apparatus is being commandeered by the
federal government.20 8 Legislative commandeering presents the most
difficult redressability problem because even if a private party were to
validly bring a claim that the federal government has illegally forced the
state to enact a law or regulation that harms the plaintiff, the relief would
come in the form of striking down the federal law, leaving the state law
untouched.20 9 Only if a state decided to repeal its own law "consenting" to
the commandeering federal law would the plaintiffs relief be granted.210
For example, in Medeiros the plaintiff alleged that the Atlantic Coastal
Fisheries Cooperative Management Act illegally commandeered Rhode
Island's state legislature as it required member states to comply with the
terms of the Act, which included a limit on daily lobster catches. 21 If one
were to assume this Act did indeed "commandeer" Rhode Island's
legislative prerogatives, and Medeiros was properly granted standing and
prevailed on the merits of his claim, the federal law, not the state regulation
that is directly harming Medeiros, would be struck down.21 2 Only if Rhode
Island independently decided that it would change the lobster regulation in
Medeiros' favor would relief actually be granted.21 3 Putting this into terms
of the redressability requirement, it is thus not likely that when a plaintiff
brings a claim attempting to invalidate a federal law on Tenth Amendment
grounds, a positive outcome for the plaintiff will result in any type of relief
from the state.24 Therefore, the redressability prong of the general
standing requirements cannot be satisfied with any certainty when the
private party alleges a legislative commandeering Tenth Amendment claim.
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As for the Printz-type Tenth Amendment claim involving the illegal
215
commandeering of a state's executive apparatus, it seems fairly unlikely
that a private party would have any justifiable reason to bring a Tenth
Amendment claim. Those likely to be harmed, if any, would be state
executive officials such as the law enforcement officers in Printz. 2 16 While
these individuals are not states, they do function as state government
officials and would likely bring a claim in conjunction with the state
attorney general, not as a private citizen. Therefore, even though the
likelihood of redress is certainly more direct in Printz-type cases, it seems
quite unlikely that a non-state official would have reason to bring a Tenth
Amendment claim.
VI. Conclusion
The Tenth Amendment, so carefully crafted by the framers of the
Constitution, is the guardian of the federal structure, which protects
individuals as citizens of the states.21 7 The very words of the Amendment
recognize this fact by stating that the people, through their respective states,
2 8
are the holders of the powers not reserved to the federal government. 1
Although proponents of private party Tenth Amendment standing are
correct in their understanding that the Tenth Amendment ultimately
protects individual citizens, 21 9 they fail to recognize that that the Tenth
Amendment directly protects state sovereignty, which in turn protects
individual liberties. 220 By taking this into account, along with the Court's
original 1939 ban on private party Tenth Amendment standing and the
modem standing requirements of direct injury and redressability, private
party Tenth Amendment standing cannot be supported. This limitation on
standing does not, as some might argue, diminish a citizen's legal rights.
Rather, the limitation gives clarity to the true objective of the Tenth
Amendment and serves a greater purpose by fostering and protecting a fair
and equitable legal system.22'
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